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Jesper Kallestrup, Copenhagen 
1. Physicalism and Dualism 
Physicalism says that all the facts, including all the 
phenomenal facts, are metaphysically necessitated by the 
physical facts. If physicalism is true at the actual world, 
there is no metaphysically possible world, which is physi-
cally identical to the actual world, but different in some 
other respect. Note that ‘physicalism’ is defined in terms of 
metaphysical necessity, because everybody should endor-
se law-like correlations between the mental and the physi-
cal, and so can accept supervenience with nomological 
necessity.  
Many philosophers believe that physicalism is false. A 
repeated line of reasoning is the so-called conceivability 
argument: a certain scenario is ideally conceivable, and 
whatever is thus conceivable is metaphysically possible, 
so this scenario is metaphysically possible. But the 
metaphysical possibility of this scenario is inconsistent with 
physicalism, so physicalism is false. Thus Descartes 
argued that it is clearly and distinctly conceivable that I 
exists without my body given that I, and not my body, is a 
thinking, non-extended thing, and whatever is thus 
conceivable is really possible by divine interference, so it’s 
possible that I exist without my body. But if it’s possible 
that I exist without my body, I’m not strictly identical to my 
body, although I’m closely connected to it, e.g. by laws of 
nature.  
Descartes took this to be an argument for substance 
dualism, the view that each of us is composed of two 
distinct existing kinds of stuff. Modern proponents of anti-
physicalism, however, don’t believe in the existence of 
mental substances. They think that all substances have 
physical properties, hence that all substances are physical 
substances, assuming mental substances are those with 
only mental properties. What they hold is merely that some 
physical substances have some mental properties that 
don’t metaphysically supervene on physical properties. 
Call this view property dualism. The kind of properties that 
the property dualists believe are the best candidates for 
failure of metaphysical supervenience are phenomenal 
properties. These involve the qualitative character of 
experience, the how-it-is-like aspect of phenomenal 
consciousness. To have knowledge of phenomenal pro-
perties is, on this view, to have irreducible, propositional, 
phenomenal information, which no amount of physical 
information will enable one to derive. Property dualists also 
deploy our purported rational access to real modalities in 
order to refute physicalism: it’s conceivable on ideal 
reflection that there be worlds physically identical to our 
world in which all qualia are inverted or absent, and what 
is ideally conceivable is metaphysically possible, so there 
are metaphysically possible inverted or absent qualia 
worlds that are physically identical to the actual world. 
Thus in (1996, 97) Chalmers argues from a possibility – 
same functional organisation but different physical consti-
tution and lack of phenomenal properties – physicalism 
allows for to a possibility – same functional organisation 
and same physical constitution but lack of phenomenal 
properties – physicalism prohibits. 
2. The Argument against Private Language 
Now, let’s turn to Wittgenstein’s considerations about 
private languages, which are centred in Philosophical 
Investigations §§256-60. What is such a language? It is a 
language that necessarily only one individual, namely its 
originator, can understand. The necessity is important. The 
argument against private language better not rule out the 
possibility of a language that as a matter of fact only one 
individual understands. Thus in the case of Robinson 
Crusoe, only one individual understands it, but someone 
else might have understood it. Moreover, a private 
language isn’t to be found amongst natural languages; it’s 
a by-product of misguided philosophical theories; §§133, 
255. The problem with a private language isn’t just that it 
doesn’t exist; it’s that it couldn’t possibly exist. The reason 
is that a language necessarily unintelligible to anyone but 
its originator is unintelligible to her as well, and a neces-
sarily unintelligible language isn’t a language at all.  
Needless to say, the subject matter of a private lan-
guage is a private subject matter, entities that necessarily 
only one individual can come to have knowledge of. The 
best candidates for privacy are mental objects and 
properties when misconceived in certain ways. Thus it’s 
part of Cartesianism that at least phenomenal properties 
are such that only the individuals who have them could 
possibly form a justified opinion about their occurrence and 
character. This isn’t a point about ownership. The question 
isn’t whether if I have a token sensation of a particular 
type, you might have had that very token or just a different 
token of the same type. The question is whether there is 
anything about my token sensation that you couldn’t 
possibly come know. If so, that token is private to me. And 
if there could be private sensations, there could presuma-
bly also be a language that reports these sensations  
Now, imagine circumstances in which a private language 
might be thought possible: the private linguist S has a 
sensation of pain that is not tied up with any typical natural 
pain-expressions such as wincing and escape-behaviour; 
§256. It’s a private particular that S has exclusive 
epistemic access to. The thought is that S introduces a 
name ‘P’ for her sensation by a private ostensive defini-
tion: 
(POD) Let ‘P’ designate this (while focusing her attention 
inwardly on the sensation).  
Thus S has mentally associated ‘P’ with her sensation. It’s 
true that S couldn’t convey the alleged meaning of ‘P’ to 
anyone else given that the sensation itself exhausts its 
meaning, and in the circumstances envisaged only S has 
epistemic access to that sensation. We assume that the 
meaning of ‘P’ is entirely constituted by its referent; if it 
isn’t, we just introduce a new term ‘Q’ for that part of the 
semantic content of ‘P’ that is determined by that sensa-
tion. So, if the subject matter of S’s language is private, 
and its meaning is due to that subject matter, then the 
meaning of her language is also private.1 Let’s grant all 
                                                     
1 As Wright (1986) points out, this assumes that mutual understanding re-
quires reason to think that mutual understanding obtains; otherwise it might 
just be that as a matter of lucky fact S* does understand S’s language, namely 
if they associate the same symbols with the same private sensations. In the 
absence of this assumption, a private language is better defined as one that 
necessarily no two people can have reason to think they share. 




that. The question is whether S herself could be said to 
understand ‘P’.  
The point in §258 is that if (POD) is to fulfil its purpose, it 
must establish a connection between the sensation and ‘P’ 
that has normative future consequences. The meaning of 
a referential term must be a property that determines 
whether a given object is correctly picked out by that term. 
If S’s mental act is to have the required semantic implica-
tions, it can’t just be an occurrent event in her conscious-
ness; S must form an intention to comply with a rule 
governing the use of ‘P’. She must “undertake” in the 
future to conform to a regularity in the use of ‘P’ sanc-
tioned by that rule such that ‘P’ is correctly used iff all and 
only sensations of the same type as the initial sensation 
are called ‘P’; §§261-3. But there’s no criterion for 
correctness that could guide S’s use of ‘P’. There’s no 
distinction between S having the impression that ‘P’ is 
used correctly, and S using ‘P’ correctly. This follows from 
the supposed private nature of the referent of ‘P’. It has no 
connection with her sayings and doings, so whether it 
occurs or not at some later time is only a question about 
whether S judges that it occurs or not at that time. But S’s 
assertion is a judgement about some state of affairs that 
are independent of the judgement. S’s assertion is correct 
iff the state of affairs asserted obtains. On the present 
view, however, there is no space for ways S’s judgements 
about the reoccurrence of the initial sensation could go 
wrong: if P occurs, yet it seems to S as if P doesn’t occur, 
S will not judge that P occurs, and if P doesn’t occur, yet it 
seems to S as if P does occur, S will judge that P occurs. 
But if there is no distinction between what is right and what 
seems right, no private meaning has been bestowed on 
‘P’. And if ‘P’ has no private meaning, and the sensation 
that ‘P’ designates is private only if the meaning of ‘P’ is 
private, there is no private sensation.  
3. Infallibility 
It may be objected that the argument begs the question 
against the Cartesian. On this conception of the mental, a 
suitable endowed subject S is not only incorrigible, but 
also infallible, and omniscient with respect to her sensa-
tional states. S introduced ‘P’ to refer to a particular token 
of a type of private phenomenal state. Given that S has an 
infallible ability to recognise and re-identify tokens of the 
same type of state in the future, there is no problem about 
S having a private practice with respect to ‘P’. On this 
view, there is a distinction between what seems right and 
what is right, i.e. the obtaining of the relevant state of 
affairs is distinct from S’s judgement that they obtain. It’s 
just that whenever they obtain, S judges that they obtain, 
and whenever they do not, S doesn’t judge that they 
obtain. But the argument assumes, or so the thought goes, 
that there are cases where S mistakenly judges that P 
occurs, and where P occurs without S judging so, and so it 
makes an assumption the Cartesian rejects. 
There are two responses. The first is that it’s doubtful 
whether it so much as makes sense to be infallible with 
respect to a private subject matter. In §§265-6 Wittgen-
stein imagines, by analogy, an individual with photographic 
memory checking when a train leaves by bringing forward 
a memory image of the page in the timetable. Now, this 
may work, because we have an independent test for the 
correctness of the memory image, namely check the 
timetable. But in the case of private sensations, there are 
no independent means by which S can inspect the 
correctness of the memory image of the original sensation. 
Unless there are external methods of testing, whatever S 
brings to mind, it will not tell him how ‘P’ is to be applied in 
future cases.2  
Secondly, even if we grant introspective infallibility and 
omniscience, that isn’t enough to make his judgements 
infallible. When S judges that now P occurs again, he 
intends to use ‘P’ with the same meaning as when he 
baptised the original sensation. That in turn presupposes 
that he brings the sensation in question under the right 
concept. But then infallibility with respect to the sensation 
falls short of infallibility with respect to the judgements. And 
surely everyone must concede that our ability for concep-
tual classification is fallible; this holds for judgements 
based on perception as well as for judgements based on 
introspection. But in the case of a private language, it 
doesn’t make sense to say that S looses track of which 
term goes with which sensation, for whichever sensation S 
judges that is P is the sensation that is P. Nor does it make 
sense to say that S has an impartial grasp of the meaning 
of ‘P’ since S is assumed to be infallible and all-knowing 
when it comes to the sensation that constitutes the whole 
meaning of ‘P’.3 This means that the Cartesian substance 
dualist’s claim that we are infallible and all-knowing with 
respect to our sensational states, is, if a meaningful claim 
at all, inessential to the argument. But then it’s hard to see 
why both forms of dualism are not in the same boat when it 
comes to the argument in question.  
4. Dualism and Privacy 
Let’s go back to the dualist arguments against physicalism. 
According to substance and property dualism, there are 
law-like correlations between mental and physical 
properties. It may be that, say being in pain and having C-
fibre firing are nomologically co-extensive properties, or 
that there are ceteris paribus laws pertaining to pain-
behaviour and pain. But that is all. There are neither 
metaphysical connections between the property of being in 
pain and neurological or behavioural properties, nor 
conceptual connections between the corresponding terms 
for those properties.4 In worlds with different laws of 
nature, individuals are in pain, but are neither in a typical 
brain-state nor display typical pain-behaviour, and in other 
worlds with yet different laws of nature, individuals have C-
fibre firing and display pain-behaviour, but have no pain. 
And what is true for pain holds for all phenomenal states. 
Such possibilities were explicitly embraced in the conceiv-
ability arguments. But this means that at least in worlds 
nomologically different from the actual world, phenomenal 
states are private in the sense we have defined the term. 
No two individuals could ever come to know about their 
respective sensations, so no two individuals can ever have 
any reasons to think they both understand ‘P’ in the same 
way, because any such reason would derive from 
circumstances that they could both at least in principle 
come to know. In the envisaged circumstances, all they 
have to go on is their respective utterances of ‘now P 
reoccurred’; there are no publicly accessible criteria for the 
correct application of ‘P’. 
                                                     
2 This reflects an earlier point about understanding in §§138-84, namely 
that to grasp the meaning of a term never consists in having a mental picture 
before the mind. 
3 Blackburn (1984, 297-300) argues that the private linguist S, if ingenious, 
can have a private practice with respect to her use of ‘P’, if she constructs a 
theory around her observations of the private sensations. On Blackburn’s 
view, S is fallible yet incorrigible. Wright (1986, 239-47) responds that this 
fallibilism fails for the same reason as the private linguist who invents no 
theory but merely ‘reports’ his sensations, because when theory and observa-
tion conflict there is no best way to resolve the inconsistency.  
4 Chalmers (1999) is explicit that phenomenal concepts are not causal con-
cepts. 




So, if the foregoing argument is sound, it afflicts all those 
views about the mental that deny metaphysical and 
conceptual connections between the mental and the 
physical. Analytical behaviourism and common-sense 
functionalism, for example, both purport to analyse mental 
vocabulary in terms of ordinary folk psychology. These 
analyses need not be conceptually reductive in any 
stronger way than the Lewis-Ramsey method requires. But 
even views that reject conceptual analysis such as 
empirical functionalism or a posteriori physicalism entail 
that mental phenomena are not necessarily private. If the 
mental is metaphysically necessitated by the physical, it is 
at least in principle empirically possible to come to know 
the former on the basis of knowledge of the latter. This 
means that on these views, mental phenomena are 
sufficiently tied up with publicly accessible circumstances. 
The fact that these circumstances are easier to get at on 
the former views makes no crucial difference as long as 
both views deny worlds where mental phenomena are 
disconnected from all such circumstances. Both forms of 
dualism, however, explicitly allow for such worlds. What 
the argument against private languages shows is, 
remember, not just that as things stand, there are no 
private languages; it is that, no matter how things are, 
there couldn’t be a private language. The upshot is 
therefore that even modern forms of dualism are faced 
with this argument.5  
                                                     
5 Chalmers [1996, 381, fn. 13] thinks the argument either rests on dubious 
premises or equally applies to everyday concepts. If the foregoing is right, both 
disjuncts are false.  
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